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I. Introduction 
In 2010, Kalief Browder, a sixteen-year-old boy, was charged 
with stealing a backpack.1 Because of Browder’s inability to pay a 
$3000 bond, the teenager languished for three years at Rikers 
Island2 awaiting trial.3 Rikers Island is located in New York City, 
and many inmates and even corrections officers notoriously refer 
to the jail as a “hellhole.” 4 This facility’s reputation stems from the 
immense brutality and corruption inside its walls.5 Browder spent 
more than 1000 days in pre-trial custody at Rikers, including 800 
days in solitary confinement.6  
Maintaining his innocence, Browder refused attractive plea 
offers given by the prosecution.7 The most alluring of these offers 
was a time-served sentence in exchange for the sixteen-year-old to 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A Boy Was Accused of Taking 
a Backpack. The Courts Took the Next Three Years of His Life., NEW YORKER (Oct. 
6, 2014) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law 
(explaining the accusation that led New York state prosecutors to charge Browder 
with robbery, grand larceny, and assault) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. Rikers is a 400-acre island in the East River across from La Guardia 
Airport that serves as the principal jail complex for New York City. 
There are 10 jails on Rikers Island, including facilities for women and 
adolescents, as well as an infirmary, power plant and 
bakery . . . . Rikers has always been a place of exceptional violence. 
During the crack epidemic in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
inmate population was nearly twice as large as it is today, weapons 
were abundant and rival gangs ruled the cellblocks. Slashings and 
stabbings among inmates at times exceeded 1,000 annually. 
What is Rikers Island?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/nyregion/rikers-island-prison-new-
york.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 3. See Gonnerman, supra note 1. 
 4. John Surico, How Rikers Island Became the Most Notorious Jail in 
America, VICE (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dp59yq/how-
rikers-island-became-the-most-notorious-jail-in-america (on file with 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 5. See id. (“The jail's problems are well-known and longstanding: 
[B]ureaucratic brutality, corruption, pain and injury inflicted upon inmates who 
have not even been convicted of committing a crime.”). 
 6. Gonnerman, supra note 1.  
 7. Id. 
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plead guilty to two misdemeanors.8 Still, Browder maintained his 
innocence, and in doing so spent more than three years behind bars 
awaiting his day in court.9 Browder’s day in court never 
happened.10 In 2013, the State dropped charges against Browder, 
charges Browder’s defense attorney referred to as “meritless.”11 
What could not be undone was the impact of Browder’s pre-trial 
detention. During his time at Rikers, Browder experienced severe 
abuse from prison officials and older inmates.12 Browder struggled 
with severe mental health issues while behind bars and following 
his release.13 In 2014, drowning in mental health issues, the 
teenager tied an air conditioning cord around his neck and killed 
himself.14 Browder’s family credits Browder’s pre-trial detention 
with driving the young boy to commit suicide.15 The teenager spent 
three years locked away from the outside world, solely because 
Browder’s family was poor and could not afford bond.16  
Kalief Browder’s story is not uncommon. Over 500,000 
individuals every year remain incarcerated because they cannot 
afford bail.17 Unlike the board game Monopoly, there is no Get Out 
of Jail Free card in the criminal justice system. How much money 
an individual has is central to their ability to combat a criminal 
                                                                                                     
 8.  Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (Jun. 
7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. (“When you go over the three years that he spent [in jail] and all 
the horrific details he endured, it’s unbelievable that this could happen to a 
[teenager] in New York City. He didn’t get tortured in some prison camp in 
another country. It was right here!”). 
 16.  See Gonnerman, supra note 1 (noting that Browder’s mother was unable 
to afford the $3000 bail set at the time of his preliminary hearing and his 
opportunity to post bail was later revoked because Browder was on probation at 
the time of the alleged crime). 
 17. See Nicole Hong & Shibani Mahtani, Cash Bail, a Cornerstone of the 
Criminal Justice System, Is Under Threat, WALL STREET J. (May 23, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cash-bail-a-cornerstone-of-the-criminal-justice-
system-is-under-threat-1495466759 (highlighting the number of individuals who 
are incarcerated but cannot afford bail) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
318 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315 (2018) 
charge.18 Sadly, for poor individuals charged with crimes, the 
scales of justice are not weighed with law or fact; rather, they are 
tipped by money.19  
The current cash bail system works in a way that punishes 
poverty. In Robinson v. California,20 the Supreme Court held that 
it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment21 to punish an 
individual for a status or condition.22 Poverty is a status.23 The 
cash bail system is unconstitutional under Robinson and the 
Eighth Amendment because it punishes the status of poverty. 
Similar to drug addiction, poverty “may be contracted innocently 
or involuntarily or it might even take hold from the moment of a 
person’s birth.”24 Kalief Browder had no control over his family’s 
financial position.25 Yet, this financial position kept him locked 
away for more than 1000 days.26 An affluent individual in 
Browder’s position would have been able to afford the $3000 cash 
bail, and thus, would have been released from pre-trial custody. 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. (“One study showed that people who spend even three days in 
pretrial detention are more likely to plead guilty, lose their jobs, detach from their 
families and commit crimes in the future.”). 
 19. See Lisa Foster, Remarks at ABA's 11th Annual Summit on Public 
Defense (Feb. 6, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
speech/director-lisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-
annual-summit) (quoting President Lyndon Johnson to describe the concern over 
current bail practices) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 20. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660, 667 (1962) (holding as 
unconstitutional a California statute making it a crime to “be addicted to the use 
of narcotics” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 22. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. (extending the no “[e]xcessive bail” 
responsibility to states through the Fourteenth Amendment) 
 23. See Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for 
Do-or-Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1619–20 (1995) (providing 
that poverty, like homelessness, is not an act, but a status). 
 24. See Erik Luna, The Story of Robinson: From Revolutionary 
Constitutional Doctrine to Modest  
Ban on Status Crimes, CRIM. L. STORIES, 47, 62 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisburg 
eds., Foundation Press 2013) (comparing poverty as a status to drug addiction, 
which was addressed in Robinson). 
 25. See Gonnerman, supra note 1. 
 26. Id. 
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Because of this reality, the current bail system functions in a way 
that punishes defendants on the basis of their economic status.27 
This Note demonstrates that the current cash bail system 
criminalizes the economic status of poverty. Because of this, the 
criminal cash bail system violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment28. Throughout this 
Note, the terms “bail” and “bond” are used interchangeably. Part I 
of this Note examines the Eighth Amendment, as well as the 
current structure and statistics surrounding the United States 
criminal bond system. Part II examines Robinson v. California, 
Powell v. Texas 29, and the effect of these two decisions on Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part III analyzes the 
constitutionality of the criminal cash bail system under Robinson. 
II. The Eighth Amendment and the United States Criminal Bond 
System 
A. The Eighth Amendment and the Evolving Standards of 
Decency 
Under the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”30 What is “cruel and unusual” is a 
continuously evolving standard.31 This standard is based largely 
upon shifting societal norms, values, and decency over time.32  
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment is frequently used in a way to constitutionalize 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Hong & Mahtani, supra note 17 (“Nearly 500,000 people are awaiting 
trial in U.S. jails, most of whom are there because they cannot afford bail . . . .”). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 29. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535–36 (1968) (plurality opinion) 
(affirming the conviction of a chronic alcoholic who was convicted for being drunk 
in public). 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 31. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (highlighting the evolving 
nature of what constitutes cruel and unusual). 
 32. See id. (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
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substantive criminal law.33 Most notably, there is an abundance of 
Eighth Amendment case law surrounding the constitutionality of 
the death penalty.34 In the last four centuries, there have been 
noticeable shifts in the societal standards of decency surrounding 
capital sentencing.35 What was once deemed acceptable and 
normative methods of punishment, such as cutting off limbs, 
boiling, hanging, beheading, and the use of firing squads, are now 
largely rejected.36  
The evolving standards of decency under the Eighth 
Amendment not only apply to methods of punishment, but also to 
the persons upon whom punishment is inflicted.37 Two recent and 
impactful changes to the constitutionality of the death penalty 
pertained to the most vulnerable individuals in society.38 In Roper 
v. Simmons39 and Atkins v. Virginia,40 the Supreme Court held 
that the implementation of the death penalty on children and 
mentally retarded individuals is cruel and unusual, and thus, 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.41  
                                                                                                     
 33. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 635 (1966) (“[R]ecent decisions 
of the Supreme Court have suggested the possibility that the eighth amendment’s 
‘cruel and unusual punishment’ clause might be used to exert substantial judicial 
influence on federal and state criminal law.”). 
 34. See Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 26, 
2018) (providing background on the history of the death penalty and the 
constitutional challenges to it) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 35. See id. (discussing the evolving standard of cruel and unusual). 
 36. See id. (same). 
 37. See Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A 
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. OF L. & SOC. PROBS. 
293, 308 (1996) (discussing the evolution of criminal status under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 38. See id. (discussing development of death penalty jurisprudence). 
 39. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit imposing the death penalty on convicts 
who had not yet reached age 18 when they committed the crimes). 
 40. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits ordering the execution of mentally retarded criminals). 
 41. See Roper, 540 U.S. at 578 (prohibiting execution of juvenile offenders); 
see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded 
criminals). 
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Although the majority of Eight Amendment challenges 
surround the death penalty, the reach of the Eighth Amendment 
extends beyond capital punishment.42 The Eighth Amendment 
touches issues surrounding fundamental features of the American 
criminal justice system, and the evolving standards of decency 
dictate what is “cruel and unusual” in these areas of criminal law.43 
B. The Criminal Cash Bond System 
There are two principal purposes that underlie the criminal 
bond system: To ensure a defendant appears to court and to 
support the safety of the public.44 In theory, bond is supposed to 
ensure that these two purposes are met, and is not intended to be 
punitive.45 Bail conditions are supposed to be substantially based 
on the assessment of these two purposes with regard to a 
particular defendant.46 There is also a third aim that underlies 
bond, yet is rarely discussed in its analysis: The release of a 
defendant.47 As a whole, bail is intended to “afford [the] release of 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A 
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS., 
293, 308 (1996) (“[C]ourts further expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment 
and invalidated various types of incorporeal punishment, such as banishment, 
expatriation, and the failure of prisons to provide adequate medical attention.”). 
 43. See id. (“If consensus is necessary for a punishment to be cruel and 
unusual, then ‘like no other constitutional provision, [the clause's] only function 
would be to legitimize . . . opinions already the conventional wisdom.’”) (quoting 
Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty 
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1782 (1970)). 
 44. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 849–50 (2016) (noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
instructs judicial officers to determine pretrial release based on a defendant’s 
flight risk and dangerousness). 
 45. See How Courts Work, ABA DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_ed
ucation_network/hoh_courts_work/bail.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Bail is 
not a fine. It is not supposed to be used as punishment. The purpose of bail is 
simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and all pretrial hearings for 
which they must be present.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice).  
 46. See Gouldin, supra note 44, at 850 (discussing bail’s purpose: To ensure 
that the accused shows at trial). 
 47. See Gouldin, supra note 44, at 863 (describing the attempt to keep 
defendants locked up as a misuse of the bail system). 
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a defendant while reasonably assuring court appearance and 
public safety.”48 
For criminal defendants charged with a crime, bail is the 
process of pre-trial release with conditions.49 There are three 
principle types of bond: A secured bond, an unsecured bond, and a 
personal recognizance bond.50 A secured bond requires a defendant 
to pay a specified cash amount, or to comply with certain conditions 
in order to be released from pre-trial detention.51 The most 
common condition of a secured bond is the requirement that a 
defendant pay a specified cash amount to be released.52 
Throughout this Note, this type of bond will be referred to as a 
secured cash bond. Non-monetary conditions can also be imposed 
on a defendant, either in lieu of a financial condition or in addition 
to one.53 These non-financial conditions can include reporting 
requirements, electronic monitoring, house arrest, no contact 
orders, or travel restrictions.54 
                                                                                                     
 48. Bail Bond, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://university.pretrial.org/ 
glossary/bailbond (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 49. See Kelly Allen, The Evolution of Money Bail Throughout History, BURNS 
INST. FOR JUST., FAIRNESS, & EQUITY (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.burnsinstitute.org/blog/the-evolution-of-money-bail-throughout-
history/ (conditioning a defendant’s pre-trial release is “meant to ensure that the 
defendant appears in court and to prevent new crime.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 50. See What is the Difference Between a Secured and Unsecured Bond?, 
BEEHIVE BAIL (May 29, 2013) http://beehivebailbonds.blogspot.com/2013/05/what-
is-difference-between-secured-and.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (naming the 
two overarching types of bonds and what they mean for the defendant) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 51. See Taking Bail Bonds, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR 
MAGISTRATES, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL SCH. OF GOV’T (Nov. 2013) 
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/13-
outline-taking_bonds-Nov%202013.pdf (explaining the differences between 
secure and unsecure bonds, as well as common conditions of release on one’s own 
recognizance) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 52. See What is the Difference Between a Secured and Unsecured Bond?, 
supra note 50 (explaining the different types of bonds). 
 53. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 524 (“The decision as to what type or combination 
of types of release on bail is appropriate for an individual defendant is within the 
discretion of the bail authority.”). 
 54. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 54 (Dec. 
2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
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An unsecured bond allows a defendant to get out of pre-trial 
custody without paying; however, if the defendant fails to appear 
a financial penalty is imposed.55 For an unsecured bond, there is 
no payment or other form of security deposit required for a 
defendant to be released.56  
Similar to an unsecured bond, a personal recognizance bond, 
commonly referred to as a release on your own recognizance or 
ROR bond, does not require that a defendant pay any monetary 
amount in order to be released.57 A personal recognizance bond 
only requires that a defendant sign an agreement to show up to 
future court dates and comply with any additional conditions, if 
imposed.58  
Depending on the jurisdiction, secured cash bonds are imposed 
through two distinct systems.59 The first, and most common, is 
through judicial discretion.60 In these jurisdictions, bail amounts 
are set by judges based on what they believe is sufficient.61 In these 
jurisdictions, bail is often imposed with a large amount of judicial 
discretion.62 These judges typically have few guidelines and 
limited information about the defendant, the offense, and the 
evidence in the case.63  
The second process of setting bail amounts is through a fixed 
bail schedule.64 A fixed bail schedule is a list that sets forth a dollar 
                                                                                                     
(listing examples of non-financial conditions of bail judges sometimes impose) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 55. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(3) (defining unsecured bonds). 
 56. See id. (same). 
 57. PA. R. CRIM. P. 524(C)(1). 
 58. See id. (same). 
 59. See Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 
26 CRIM. JUST. 1 (2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/cjsp11_bail.authcheckdam.pdf 
(comparing bail schedules to judicial discretion) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 60. See id. (considering whether bail schedules displace judicial discretion). 
 61. See id. (describing generally the role of judicial discretion in the bail 
system). 
 62. See id. (same). 
 63. See id. (same). 
 64. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 4 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
(addressing the pre-trial incarceration of nonviolent offenders in New York City 
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amount of bail for every crime.65 For a fixed bail schedule, the only 
consideration for a cash bail amount is the offense.66 In some 
jurisdictions with bail schedules, judges have the ability to lower 
the amount demanded by the schedule; however, in most, judges 
are bound by this list.67 This method of setting bail amounts is 
largely criticized.68 The American Bar Association (ABA) flatly 
rejects this practice, and has stated that “[t]he practice of using 
bail schedules leads inevitably to the detention of some persons 
who would be good risks but are simply too poor [to afford 
bail] . . . .”69 
Today, the use of secured cash bonds and preventative 
detention is at an all-time high.70 Every year, the United States 
locks up over half a million individuals because they are unable to 
afford their secured cash bond amount.71 In the last two centuries, 
the proportion of felony charged defendants released on an 
unsecured bond has decreased by twelve percent and the average 
secured cash bond amount has increased from $24,000 to 
$55,400.72 A secured cash bond appears to be the default, not a 
limited exception.73  
                                                                                                     
and providing previously unpublished data related to New York City’s bail 
reforms) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 65. See id. (explaining bail schedules). 
 66. See id. (same). 
 67. See Bail Schedule Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/b/bail-schedule/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2018) 
(explaining how bail schedule lists operate and providing examples of related local 
court rules) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 68. See Carlson, supra note 59 (raising a concern that fixed schedules are 
arbitrary). 
 69. Id. (citing ABA Standard 10-5.3 (e) at 113). 
 70. See Pretrial Release and Detention: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prd-
bra84.pdf (explaining how common secured cash bonds and preventative 
detention is) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 71. See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, 
Future Crime, and Employment, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201–02 (2016) (showing 
how many defendants are unable to afford their secured cash bond). 
 72. See id. (same). 
 73. See id. (describing generally the prevalence of secured cash bond).  
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Further, statistics suggest that the increased use of secured 
cash bonds and cash bond amounts, have not increased public 
safety nor court appearance.74 In 2016, there were more than 
646,000 people incarcerated in the United States local jails, and 
seventy percent of these people were in pre-trial custody.75 
“Because a system of money bail allows income to be 
the determining factor in whether someone can be released 
pretrial, our nation’s local jails are incarcerating too many people 
who are likely to show up for their court date and unlikely to be 
arrested for new criminal activity.”76  
For many years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has 
voiced concerns over the current cash bail system, specifically the 
expansive use of secured cash bonds.77 The ABA stated that a 
secured cash bond: 
[U]ndermines the integrity of the criminal justice system, is 
unfair to poor defendants, and is ineffective in achieving key 
objectives of the pretrial release/detention decision. The ABA’s 
Standards for Pretrial Release mandate that financial 
conditions should be used only when no other conditions will 
provide reasonable assurance a defendant will appear for future 
court appearances. If financial conditions are imposed, the court 
should first consider releasing the defendant on an unsecured 
bond, and if that is deemed an insufficient condition of release, 
bail should be set at the lowest level necessary to ensure the 
defendant’s appearance and with regard to his financial ability. 
Significantly, ABA Standard 10-1.4 prohibits bail that results 
in pretrial detention: ‘The judicial officer should not impose a 
financial condition of release that results in the pretrial 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Michael R. Jones, Unsecured Bonds: The Most Effective and Efficient 
Pretrial Release Option, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (OCT. 2013), 
www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=269164 (arguing that 
unsecured bonds are just as effective as secured ones) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 75. Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Detaining the Poor: How Money Bail 
Perpetuates an Endless Cycles of Poverty and Jail Time, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(May 10, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/incomejails.html (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 4 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf (“The 
American Bar Association (ABA) has long criticized money bail . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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detention of a defendant solely due to the defendant’s inability 
to pay.’78 
It is not only organizations such as the American Bar 
Association that have voiced concerns on this issue.79 In addition 
to the American Bar Association (ABA), many defense attorneys, 
pro-defendant organizations, prosecutors, sheriffs, and 
correctional officers have made known their concerns with the 
mass incarceration of the poor through secured cash bonds.80 Both 
sides of the criminal justice system acknowledge the issues that 
stem from the excessive use of secured cash bonds.81  
Concerns over the criminal bond system stem largely from the 
alarming statistics surrounding criminal bond. In 2008, 
eighty-seven percent of individuals charged with misdemeanors in 
New York City were unable to afford a secured bond of $1,000 or 
less.82 Of this eighty-seven percent, each defendant spent an 
average of sixteen days in jail because they could not pay for their 
release.83  
                                                                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. (listing institutions that have restrained their cash bail systems). 
 80. See Steve Schmadeke, Cash Bail Under Fire As Discriminatory While 
Poor Inmates Languish in Jail, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-cook-county-cash-bail-
met-20161114-story.html (describing concerns over cash bail system) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Michael 
Hardy, In Fight Over Bail’s Fairness, a Sherriff Joins Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/houston-bail-reform-sheriff-
gonzalez.html?_r=0 (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice); Kent Faulk, DOJ Reminds Judges They Can’t Jail Poor 
Simply Because They Can’t Pay Fines, ALABAMA.COM (last updated March 16, 
2016), 
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/03/doj_reminds_judges_they
_cant_j.htm (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 81. See Schmadeke, supra note 80 (“The cash-bail system has increasingly 
come under fire nationally and in Chicago as discriminatory, stranding largely 
indigent, minority defendants for months as they await trial for nonviolent 
offenses.”). 
 82. The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 2 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 83. Id. 
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In Maryland, more than 80,000 defendants were incarcerated 
pre-trial from 2011 to 2015 due to an inability to pay a monetary 
bond.84 More alarming, 17,000 of these defendants were unable to 
pay a bond of $5,000 or less.85 If these defendants in Maryland 
hired a bondsman, it is likely they would only have had to pay 
around $500 for their freedom, yet they were unable to meet even 
that financial burden.86 To be released from jail, typically a 
defendant need only pay a bonding company around ten percent of 
the total bond and the company will pay the remainder.87 
Additionally, in Cook County, Illinois, as many as 400 
individuals remain locked up on any given day because they cannot 
pay a bond amount of $1,000 or less for non-violent crimes.88 In 
2016, the Cook County Jail reported that approximately 300 
individuals remained locked up because they could not afford to 
pay a $100 bond.89 Although a $100 secured cash bond may be 
considered “nominal” to some, for others, it is an impossible 
financial burden to meet.90  
                                                                                                     
 84. Arpit Gupta, The US Bail System Punishes the Poor and Rewards the 
Rich, QUARTZ (Feb. 2, 2017), https://qz.com/900777/the-us-bail-system-punishes-
the-poor-and-rewards-the-rich/ (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 85. Arpit Gupta, et al., The High Cost of Bail: How Maryland’s Reliance on 
Money Bail Jails the Poor and Costs the Community Millions, MD. OFF. OF THE 
PUB. DEFENDER, 4 (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/High%20Cost%20of%20Bail.pd
f (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 86. See id. (stating that going through a bondsman would mean only having 
to pay 10% of the total bond). 
 87. See id. at 8. (same). 
 88. Megan Crepeau, Judges Ordered to Set Affordable Bonds for Defendants 
Who Pose No Danger, CHI. TRIB. (July 17, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-cook-county-bail-reform-
met-20170717-story.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 89. Steve Schmadeke, Cash Bail Under Fire as Discriminatory While Poor 
Inmates Languish in Jail, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-cook-county-cash-bail-
met-20161114-story.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 90. See id. (explaining the difficulty some face in meeting a $100 secured 
cash bond).  
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These statistics surrounding bond have recently been brought 
to the forefront in several lawsuits.91 In a 2017 civil lawsuit against 
Harris County, Texas, the court assessed the constitutionality of 
bond practices in Harris County under Equal Protection and Due 
Process.92 The Harris County Jail is the third largest jail in the 
country, and in Texas, three-fourths of all individuals incarcerated 
are in pre-trial detention due to an inability to pay a secured 
monetary bail.93 The plaintiffs in the suit challenged what they 
referred to as a “wealth-based detention scheme.”94 
In support of their suit, the plaintiffs submitted approximately 
300 written exhibits and 2,300 video-recordings of bail hearings.95 
In one of these video-recordings, a homeless defendant charged 
with illegally sleeping under a highway was given a secured cash 
bond of $5,000 by the judge.96 From the video evidence in the 
lawsuit, it was clear that many Harris County judges and hearing 
officers who make the initial bail decision, imposed high bail 
amounts upon defendants, whom they knew would not be able to 
pay.97 Further, many of these defendants were charged with 
non-violent misdemeanors.98 Thus, their risk of flight or danger to 
public safety was likely very low. 
After the District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
reviewed the evidence, read both parties’ briefs, and listened to 
oral arguments, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
                                                                                                     
 91. See id. (describing the various state lawsuits alleging that criminal court 
judges regularly set cash bail amounts that defendants cannot afford). 
 92. See O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1057–62 (S.D. Tex. 
2017) (describing the constitutional issues and procedural posture in the case).  
 93. Id. at 1058. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1061. 
 96. See Michael Hardy, In Fight Over Bail’s Fairness, a Sherriff Joins 
Critics, N.Y. TIMES (March 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/ 
houston-bail-reform-sheriff-gonzalez.html?_r=0 (describing the contents of the 
videos entered into evidence by the plaintiffs in the Harris County lawsuit) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 97. See id. (“Videos played in court this week showed hearing officers 
imposing bonds on mentally disturbed detainees, or telling homeless defendants 
they could be released without paying if only they had an address.”). 
 98. See id. (“The class-action lawsuit contends that on any given night, 
several hundred people are in the Harris County jail on misdemeanor charges 
solely because they cannot make bail.”).  
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granted a preliminary injunction.99 The court held that because 
Harris County’s bail practices detained individuals charged with 
misdemeanors by imposing secured money bail that they could not 
afford, it was unconstitutional.100 The court stated: “[U]nder 
federal and state law, secured money bail may serve to detain 
indigent misdemeanor arrestees only in the narrowest of cases, and 
only when, in those cases, due process safeguards the rights of the 
indigent accused.”101 In June 2018, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s finding that the Harris County bail-setting 
procedures violated the due process clause and the equal 
protection clause; however, the court determined that the 
preliminary injunction imposed by the District Court was 
overbroad and remanded the case.102 
The use of a secured cash bond is not keeping the most 
dangerous individuals in pre-trail confinement or ensuring that 
individuals who pose a flight risk come to court. Rather, it keeps 
many poor individuals charged with non-violent crimes locked up 
because of their lack of financial resources.103 “In the truest sense, 
the ability to pay for bail is the ability to buy temporary freedom—
and there is a wide disparity in America’s ability to do so.”104 The 
use of these secured cash bonds as a means of punishing 
defendants, simply because of their financial status, is violative of 
the Eighth Amendment, and the principles set forth in Robinson v. 
California.105 
                                                                                                     
 99. See O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68 (describing the evidence the 
court considered before granting a preliminary injunction in the matter).  
 100. See id. at 1057. (ruling that the Harris County bail practices were 
unconstitutional).  
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. See O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F. 3d 147, 163–164 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(affirming the lower court decision in part, but finding that the preliminary 
injunction was overbroad).  
 103. See Foster, supra note 19 (stating that the majority of individuals who 
are held in pre-trial custody are poor). 
 104. See Dan Kopf, America’s Peculiar Bail System, PRICEONOMICS, (May 26. 
2015) https://priceonomics.com/americas-peculiar-bail-system/ (showing the 
peculiarities of America’s bail system by using the case of Freddie Gray and others 
as examples) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 105. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a 
statute criminalizing narcotics addiction is unconstitutional under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment). 
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III. Robinson, Powell, and their Legacy on Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
A. Robinson v. California 
In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California106 
that a statute which criminalized narcotics addiction was 
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment.107 “Lawrence Robinson was a 
twenty-five-year-old army veteran who lived in Los Angeles.”108 
One night, as Robinson was driving home, he was stopped by an 
officer because his rear license plate was not illuminated.109 When 
the officer approached the car, he noticed that Robinson had a 
“fresh needle mark” on his arm.110 When questioned, Robinson 
admitted to being a heroine user.111 Robinson was then arrested 
and charged with being “addicted to narcotics,” a misdemeanor 
under California law.112 At trial, the jury was instructed that the 
mere status of being a drug addict was sufficient to convict 
Robinson.113 Ultimately, the jury found that Robinson was 
addicted to drugs, and convicted him under the California 
                                                                                                     
 106. See id. (same). 
 107. See id. at 666 (“But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a 
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be 
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 108. Luna, supra note 24, at 52. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. (“The officer also testified that the appellant under questioning 
had admitted to the occasional use of narcotics.”). 
 112. See id. (“A misdemeanor complaint was filed against Robinson . . . 
charging him with using, being under the influence of, and being addicted to 
narcotics.”). 
 113. Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A 
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 
293, 310 (1996). 
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statute.114 Robinson subsequently appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.115 
While the Supreme Court decided whether to grant certiorari 
in Robinson’s case, Justice Harlan expressed concern over the 
California statute.116 In his review of the trial record, Justice 
Harlan believed “given that Robinson appeared to have been 
punished not for his conduct but only for his status,”117 there were 
serious constitutional concerns in this case.118 
The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari, and 
reversed Robinson’s conviction.119 In a 6-2 decision, the Court held 
that a state law which criminalizes the “status” of being addicted 
to narcotics inflicted cruel and unusual punishment and violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.120 Specifically, the Court 
found the portion of the statute referring to drug addiction was 
based on a condition or status, not an overt act, and therefore was 
unconstitutional.121 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, 
compared the criminalization of drug addiction to other conditions 
which are involuntary or contracted innocently:122  
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would 
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally 
ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. . . . But, 
in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which 
made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be 
                                                                                                     
 114. See Luna, supra note 24, at 56 (“‘We, the jury in the above entitle cause, 
find the defendant guilty of the offense charged.’ This general verdict provided no 
clue as to whether the jurors believed that Robinson had used drugs, was addicted 
to the use of drugs, or both.”). 
 115. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660. 
 116. See Luna, supra note 24, at 56 (“After examining the trial record, Harlan 
concluded that the California statute was ‘capable of the most mischievous sort of 
abuse . . . .’”). 
 117. See id. (same). 
 118. See id. (“Harlan concluded that . . . the ‘case raised serious constitutional 
concerns.’”). 
 119. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–68. 
 120. See id. at 666–67 (holding that a statute criminalizing narcotics 
addiction is unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment). 
 121. See id. at 666–68 (same). 
 122. See id. at 667 (comparing drug addition to other innocently contracted 
illnesses such as a cold, and finding that it would be cruel and unusual to 
criminalize these involuntary illnesses).  
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universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.123 
By using these examples, Justice Stewart articulated that the 
punishment of a disease such as addiction, or an involuntary 
condition like a mental or physical illness, runs afoul to the 
evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment.124 In 
the concurring opinion, Justice Douglas appeared to agree with 
these sentiments, and stated that “the age of enlightenment 
cannot tolerate [the] barbarous action” of criminalizing addiction 
itself.125 The majority opinion set forth the principle that it is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment for a state to 
punish an individual for their mere status or condition.126 Thus, 
Robinson limited a state’s ability to criminalize or punish certain 
crimes or acts.127 
Justice White was the only dissenting Justice in Robinson.128 
Justice White disagreed with the majority finding that Robinson’s 
addiction effectively worked as a disease, and found that there was 
insufficient evidence to show that Robinson had lost all ability to 
control his actions.129 “Because Justice White did not consider 
Robinson to possess the status of a narcotics addict, he did not 
reach the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
punishment of a status . . . .”130 However, in the beginning of his 
dissent, Justice White stated: “If appellant’s conviction rested 
upon sheer status, condition or illness or if he was convicted for 
being an addict who had lost his power of self-control, I would have 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 666. 
 124. See id. at 667 (“Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.’”).  
 125. Id. at 677. (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 126. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (asserting the 
unconstitutionality of a state imprisoning a person who has never touched a 
narcotic drug in said state, nor been guilty of any irregular behavior in that state). 
 127. See id. (finding “[a]lthough there was evidence in the present case that 
the appellant had used narcotics in Los Angeles, the jury were instructed that 
they could convict him even if they disbelieved that evidence,” and this was 
unconstitutional). 
 128. Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting). 
 129. See id. at 687 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]here was no evidence at all that 
appellant had lost the power to control his acts.”). 
 130. Smith, supra note 42, at 311. 
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other thoughts about this case.”131 From this statement, it appears 
Justice White may have joined the majority in their conclusion 
that the punishment of a status or involuntary condition is 
unconstitutional if Robinson had shown that his addiction to drugs 
had rendered him helpless to control his actions.132 
B. Interpreting Robinson & Its Legacy 
The legacy of Robinson seems to be surrounded by many 
questions but few affirmative answers.133 The questions largely 
surround exactly how to interpret the Supreme Court decision and 
Robinson’s impact on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.134 Many 
scholars have argued that there are multiple ways to interpret 
Robinson and disagree on the constitutional limits it has placed on 
a state’s power to criminalize.135 Although many commentators 
have struggled to articulate the constitutional principles of 
Robinson, the Harvard Law Review published a note in 1966 that 
identified several ways to interpret and apply the decision.136 The 
note “suggested [that there are] three ways to apply Robinson: 
‘[P]ure status,’ ‘a status one cannot change,’ and ‘involuntariness 
of the acquisition of the status.’”137  
For the “pure status rationale,” the theory is that Robinson 
established that a state cannot criminalize a status unless there is 
                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 311–12.  
 132. See id. (describing how Justice White dissented because he disagreed 
with the underlying factual conclusion that Robinson was an addict; therefore, he 
did not consider whether the Eighth Amendment precludes punishment for a 
status crime).  
 133. See Luna, supra note 24, at 65 (“[T]he major issue was the decision’s 
impact on criminal justice throughout the nation.”). 
 134. See id. (“Part of the problem was the ambiguous rationale for the Court’s 
judgment, providing ideal material for scholarship.”). 
 135. See Kate Smith-Cabranes, Criminal Law and the Supreme Court: An 
Essay on the Jurisprudence of Byron White, 74 UNIV. OF COLO. L. REV. 1523, 1532 
(2003) (“The opinion for the majority . . . is famously ambiguous, suggesting three 
possible limitations on a state’s power to criminalize.”). 
 136. See Smith, supra note 42, at 312 (suggesting three ways to apply the 
Robinson decision).  
 137. Id. (citing Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 646–55 (1966)). 
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an overt commission of a specific act.138 The pure status theory is 
the narrowest of the three, and limits Robinson’s reach.139 The 
“status one cannot change” and “involuntariness” theories are 
broader in their applicability.140 For “a status one cannot change,” 
the principle thought is that under Robinson, a state cannot 
punish someone for a status that they have no ability to change.141 
This approach, which appears to, at least in part, be rejected by 
the Supreme Court in Powell,142 places emphasis on the ability of 
a defendant to control his actions.143 Under this approach, a drug 
addict cannot be punished for his actions pertaining to drugs 
because of his inability to control his addiction.144 
The “involuntariness” rationale seems to overlap with “a 
status one cannot change,” but this theory is focused more on 
acquisition.145 Under this theory of volition, the determinate factor 
concerning if a defendant can be held criminally responsible for his 
actions is whether the acquisition of the status was voluntary.146 If 
it was not voluntary, the acts compelled by the involuntary 
condition are “immune from punishment.”147 If it was voluntary, 
the principle in Robinson would not extend to this defendant.148 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Note, supra note 33, at 650 (“This theory maintains that statutes 
which directly criminalize status (the ‘pure status’ crimes) violate the Eighth 
Amendment, while statutes that facially criminalize ‘acts’ are presumptively not 
suspect.”). 
 139. See id. (“The clear implication of such a theory is that no law may 
criminally punish drug addiction. Unless addiction is defined to require the 
commission of acts.”). 
 140. See id. at 650–55 (comparing the three theories). 
 141. See id. at 650–54 (“[T]he emphasis of this approach is on the inability of 
the individual to extricate himself from his condition . . . .”).  
 142. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (“And in any event this 
Court has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea.”). 
 143. See Note, supra note 33, at 650–54 (“[T]he emphasis of this approach is 
on the inability of the individual to extricate himself from his condition . . . .”).  
 144. See id. (“That laws punishing a drug addict for acts such as possession, 
use, purchase, and self-administration of narcotics are prohibited by 
Robinson . . . has been urged in a number of recent cases.”). 
 145. See id. at 654. (stating that under the Involuntariness Rationale, there 
are distinctions between conditions that are acquired voluntarily and those that 
are acquired involuntarily).  
 146. See id. (“If the acquisition was involuntary, he would not be punishable; 
if voluntary, there would be no constitutional objection to punishment.”). 
 147. See id (describing the ‘involuntariness’ rationale).  
 148. See id. (“If the acquisition was . . . voluntary, there would be no 
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Although there are opposing views on the reach of Robinson, 
there seems to be a consensus that Robinson, at a minimum, 
“stand[s] for the proposition that the government cannot punish 
individuals for their status—who they are, more or less—but only 
for what they do.”149 Thus, under Robinson, an individual cannot 
be punished for their mere status or involuntary condition.150 
Overall, the influence of Robinson on Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been relatively modest.151 However, Eighth 
Amendment challenges using Robinson have been fairly successful 
in striking down vagrancy ordinances and other statutes which 
criminalize homelessness.152  
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Nevada struck down an 
ordinance which made it a misdemeanor for an individual with a 
physical ability to work and no visible means of support, to be in a 
public place.153 The Court found that the local vagrancy ordinance 
criminalized poverty, thus punished a mere status and was 
unconstitutional.154 Quoting the Supreme Court in Edwards v. 
California, the Supreme Court of Nevada refused to uphold the 
vagrancy ordinance which punished poor individuals: “We should 
say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere property 
status . . . cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his 
rights as a citizen of the United States. ‘Indigence’ in itself is 
neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them.”155  
In addition to the Supreme Court of Nevada, numerous other 
courts have cited Robinson in overturning statutes that 
                                                                                                     
constitutional objection to punishment.”). 
 149. Luna, supra note 24, at 65. 
 150. See id. (“The word ‘status’ appeared throughout the various opinions, 
suggesting that the decision constitutionalized the status-conduct distinction.”). 
 151. See Luna, supra note 24, at 82–83 (“Robinson now stands as a modest 
ban on status crimes and not much more.”); see also Smith, supra note 42, at 317 
(“The Robinson Doctrine’s influence on the law has generally been ‘modest.’”). 
 152. See Luna, supra note 24, at 82–83 (“Robinson could be seen as the first 
step toward purging these crimes from American criminal codes, with later 
decisions completing the process through other means . . . .”). 
 153. See Parker v. Mun. Judge, 83 Nev. 214, 215 (1967) (holding that the 
disorderly person ordinance was unconstitutional because it criminalized a 
status). 
 154. See id. at 215 (finding that the local vagrancy ordinance violated due 
process). 
 155. Id.  
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criminalize homelessness and poverty. In 1967, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down a vagrancy 
statute.156 In doing so, the court used Robinson, and found the 
statute to be “repugnant” because it effectively treated poverty as 
a criminal offense.157 In continuance of this trend, in 1993, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
granted injunctive relief for a claim under § 1983 which challenged 
the constitutionality of Miami’s vagrancy and anti-sleeping 
ordinances.158 The court applied Robinson, and invalidated the 
ordinances because they unconstitutionally criminalized the 
status of being homeless.159  
Although several courts have used Robinson to overturn 
vagrancy ordinances, others have refused to do so.160 However, 
these decisions to criminalize homelessness have come with 
backlash.161 In 1964, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
upheld a vagrancy statute, without any reference to Robinson.162 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.163 Justice 
Douglas, in a passion-filled dissent, argued that “[he] did not see 
how economic or social status can be made a crime any more than 
being an addict can be.”164  
                                                                                                     
 156. See Alegata v. Mass. (and four companion cases), 353 Mass. 287, 297 
(1967) (“Idleness and poverty should not be treated as a criminal offense.”).  
 157. Id. at 295–97 (“We hold that challenged portions of § 66 are void on their 
face as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 158. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1584 (1992) 
(“Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the City of Miami . . . has a custom, practice 
and policy of arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people 
for engaging in basic activities of daily life—including sleeping and eating—in the 
public places where they are forced to live.”). 
 159. See id. at 1562, 1584 (finding Robinson to be the leading Supreme Court 
case concerning judicial prohibition of status-based abuse of police power under 
the Eighteenth Amendment). 
 160. See Luna, supra note 24, at 69 (describing unsuccessful challenges to 
vagrancy statutes using Robinson). 
 161. See id. (detailing several successful challenges to vagrancy statutes 
using Robinson). 
 162. Id. See generally Hicks v. District of Columbia, 197 A.2d 154 (D.C. 1964), 
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (holding that the 
statute was not unconstitutional because it only punished “those who lead an 
immoral or profligate life”). 
 163. Hicks, 383 U.S. at 252. 
 164. Id. 
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Though the Robinson Doctrine has had success invalidating 
anti-sleeping and vagrancy laws,165 challenges using Robinson to 
invalidate statutes which pertain to alcoholism and similar 
addictions, have been less successful.166  
C. Powell v. Texas 
In 1968, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, refused to 
extend Robinson to a Texas statute criminalizing public 
intoxication.167 In Powell v. Texas, Powell was arrested and 
convicted under a Texas Statute which criminalized public 
intoxication.168 Powell appealed his conviction, and argued that 
because he was a chronic alcoholic, his disease made it impossible 
for him to voluntarily control his drinking.169 Further, Powell 
argued that because his appearance in public while intoxicated 
was due to an involuntary condition, to punish him under the 
Texas Statute would violate Robinson and the Eighth 
Amendment.170  
The Court rejected Powell’s argument.171 Justice Marshall, 
writing the plurality opinion, recognized that under Robinson, a 
state cannot criminalize a status; however, a chronic alcoholic 
punished for being drunk in public was not synonymous.172 The 
                                                                                                     
 165. See Smith, supra note 42, at 319–20 (detailing several successful 
challenges to vagrancy statutes using Robinson). 
 166. See Luna, supra note 24, at 69–70 (comparing outcomes of Robinson 
challenges on vagrancy ordinances against statutes pertaining to addition). 
 167. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (holding Robinson did not 
apply to the public intoxication statute, because the act of drinking or being drunk 
in public in this specific case was voluntary). 
 168. Id. at 517 ("In late December 1966, appellant was arrested and charged 
with being found in a state of intoxication in a public place, in violation Vernon’s 
Ann. Texas Penal Code, Art. 477 (1952). . . .”).  
 169. See id. (“His counsel urged that appellant was ‘afflicted with the disease 
of chronic alcoholism,’ that ‘his appearance in public (while drunk) was not of his 
own volition,’ and therefore that to punish him criminally for that conduct would 
be cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments . . . .”). 
 170. See id. (same). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. at 531(holding that Powell’s case was different than Robinson 
because Powell was being punished for a voluntary act). 
338 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315 (2018) 
plurality used the dissent from Robinson and argued that a status 
differs from a condition.173 Additionally, Justice Marshall stated 
that it was unclear that chronic alcoholism was per se an 
involuntary condition, and rejected the notion that free will is not 
involved in an individual’s choice to consume alcohol.174 The Court 
found that although Powell’s alcoholism influenced his decisions to 
drink, his alcoholism was not completely overpowering, and thus 
was not involuntary.175 Therefore, for Robinson to apply, the 
condition must be involuntary, and here the Court stated it was 
not.176 
Further, the Court found that Powell had the requisite actus 
reus to be charged and convicted of a crime.177 The crux of the 
plurality opinion attempted to limit “Robinson’s thrust to actus 
reus concerns rather than to the more expansive mens rea issues 
entailed in Powell’s claim that he was not criminally responsible” 
due to his chronic alcoholism.178 Justice Marshall noted that unlike 
Robinson, the defendant in this matter had committed some act, 
or been engaged in a specific type of behavior.179 The Court 
interpreted Robinson: 
The entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be 
                                                                                                     
 173. See id. at 535 (same). 
 174. See id. (“We are unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the 
current state of medical knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general, and 
Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink 
and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their 
performance of either or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from 
public intoxication.”). 
 175. See id. (same). 
 176. See id. (holding that because Powell’s condition was voluntary, Robinson 
did not apply). 
 177. See id. at 533 ("The entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted 
only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which 
society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, 
has committed some actus reus.”). 
 178. Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. California in Wake of Jones 
v. Los Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by Attending to 
“Punishment”, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 438 (2008). 
 179. See id. (“[U]nlike the defendant in Robinson, Powell was not convicted 
for a status. . . but for his ‘act’ of ‘being [appearing] in public while drunk on a 
particular occasion.’”). 
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inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has 
engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in 
preventing . . . [and] has committed some actus reus. It thus 
does not deal with the question of whether certain conduct 
cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, 
‘involuntary’ . . . .180  
Through the Court’s interpretation of Robinson, the plurality 
distinguished the Texas statute, which criminalized the act of 
being drunk in public, from the statute in Robinson, which 
punished being addicted to drugs.181 
Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Robinson, 
joined the dissent in Powell.182 The dissent rejected the majority’s 
interpretation of Robinson and understood Robinson to stand for 
the principle that criminal penalties cannot be inflicted upon an 
individual for a condition he is powerless to change.183 Further, the 
dissent stated that Robinson and the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the punishment of individuals for their status, and is not 
contingent upon whether the individual has committed a 
particular act.184  
Although the Texas statute, as defined, differs from the 
California statute in Robinson, the dissent urged that “the 
constitutional defect” was the same.185 Both defendants were 
punished for “being in” a condition which he “had no capacity to 
change or avoid.”186 The dissenting Justices examined the trial 
court record and found that the factual findings were integral to 
determine whether alcoholism is an involuntary condition, like the 
narcotics addiction found in Robinson.187 “[T]he trial judge, sitting 
                                                                                                     
 180. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968). 
 181. See id. at 532 (emphasis added) (“The State of Texas has not sought to 
punish a mere status as California did in Robinson. . . .”). 
 182. Id. at 554–70 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 183. See id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“But the essential constitution 
defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in both cases the defendant was 
accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to change or avoid.”). 
 184. See id. (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“Criminal penalties may not be inflicted 
upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”). 
 185. See id. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“But the essential constitution 
defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in both cases the defendant was 
accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to change or avoid.”). 
 186. Id. (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 187. See id. at 554–70 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (stating that the findings in the 
case with the background of the medical and social data lead to the conclusion 
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as a trier of fact, found upon medical and other relevant testimony 
that Powell was a chronic alcoholic,”188 unable to resist the 
continuous urge to consume excess amounts of alcohol.189 Because 
of this, the dissent argued that prosecuting Powell under the Texas 
statute constituted Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment because the statute punished him for an 
involuntary condition.190  
D. Post-Powell: The Eighth Amendment & Robinson 
Overall, Eight Amendment challenges using Robinson to 
invalidate statutes criminalizing intoxication have been an uphill 
battle.191 The Powell decision appeared to limit the reach of 
Robinson, and left even more questions to be answered about 
Robinson and its legacy.192 There was concern that Justice 
Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Robinson, disagreed 
with the majority interpretation of Robinson in Powell.193 
Furthermore, many scholars have found Justice White’s 
concurrence, which gave the fifth vote to the plurality in Powell, to 
align more closely with the dissenting Justices’ interpretation of 
Robinson.194  
In his concurrence, Justice White agreed with the majority’s 
conclusion, and found that Powell himself did not sufficiently 
demonstrate that his alcoholism made it so “he was unable to stay 
off the streets on the night in question”; however, Justice White 
                                                                                                     
that the statute in reference to Powell was unconstitutional). 
 188. Id. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. (Fortas, J., dissenting) (stating that the trial court judge found Powell 
was a “chronic alcoholic”). 
 190. Id. (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“I read these findings to mean that appellant 
was powerless to avoid drinking . . . .”). 
 191. See Luna, supra note 24 at 68 (Describing Robinson-based constitutional 
challenges and that most failed).  
 192. See id. (same). 
 193. See Benno Weisburg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violated the 
Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine of Homelessness and Other 
Contextual Crimes, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 334–41 (2005) (describing 
Justice Stewarts’ opinion in Robinson and how the opinion should be read ). 
 194. See Gardner, supra note 178, at 440–41 (“White’s opinion shares a much 
closer affinity with the dissent than to the plurality opinion.”). 
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left open the possibility that the Texas Statute might violate 
Robinson if applied to another defendant.195 Justice White stated,  
The fact remains that some chronic alcoholics must drink and 
hence must drink somewhere. Although many chronics have 
homes, many others do not. For all practical purposes the public 
streets may be home for these unfortunates, not because their 
disease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, 
they have no place else to go and no place else to be when they 
are drinking. This is more a function of economic station than 
of disease, although the disease may lead to destitution and 
perpetuate that condition. For some of these alcoholics I would 
think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness is 
impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is 
also impossible. As applied to them this statute is in effect a law 
which bans a single act for which they may not be convicted 
under the Eighth Amendment–the act of getting drunk.196 
After Powell, several courts and legislative bodies have 
adopted a volition requirements for criminal liability.197 The Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted the principles of 
Robinson similarly to the dissenting Justices in Powell in 
determining volition.198 The Fourth Circuit recognized alcoholism 
as a disease, and because of this, refused to uphold prosecutions 
under public intoxication statutes.199 Using Robinson, the circuit 
court found that an individual who suffers from the disease of 
alcoholism would not have the necessary mens rea to be punished 
for the act of being drunk in public.200  
After Powell v. Texas, there are more questions surrounding 
the actual impact of the Robinson decision.201 Did Robinson give 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 554 (White, J., concurring) (“Because Powell did 
not show that his conviction offended the Constitution [that he was unable to stay 
off the streets that night] I concur the judgment . . . .”). 
 196. Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring). 
 197. See Luna, supra note 24, at 70 (describing post-Powell constitutional 
challenges). 
 198. See id. (“After recognizing alcoholism as a disease that compelled 
excessive drinking, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s presence in 
public was neither of his own will nor accompanied by a culpable mental state.”). 
 199. See id. (same). 
 200. See id. (same). 
 201. See id. at 79 (listing questions that followed the Robinson and Powell 
decisions). 
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the Eighth Amendment any teeth? Or did the Supreme Court in 
Powell severely limit the decisions reach? 
IV. Analyzing the Criminal Cash Bond System Under Robinson  
A. Poverty as a Status  
It is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to 
criminalize a status.202 A “status crime” is a crime defined by who 
a person is, not by what they do.203 This is a crime for which an 
individual is “guilty by being in a certain condition or of a specific 
character.”204  
Poverty is a status, and to criminally punish an individual 
because of this financial status is unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment. According to Merriam Webster, the definition 
of status is 1: “[A] position or rank in relation to others” or 3: “A 
state or condition with respect to circumstances.”205 The amount of 
money an individual has determines his rank or position in 
relation to all others in society.206 The very words economic and 
status are frequently linked together to describe an individual’s 
position.207 Poverty is also a condition, one which statistics show is 
often immutable.208 Merriam Webster defines condition as 4: “[A] 
                                                                                                     
 202. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962) (“To be addicted to 
the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition and not an act” and statute 
prohibiting such status violates U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 203. See Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for 
Do-or-Die Acts of the Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1620–22 (1995) (defining 
status crime). 
 204. Status Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 205. Status, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018) 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/status (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 206. See Tori DeAngelis, Class Differences, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/02/class-differences.aspx (“In a 2012 paper 
in Psychological Review . . . posit that social class—which they define as ‘a social 
context that individuals inhabit in enduring and pervasive ways over time’—is a 
fundamental lens through which we see ourselves and others.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 207. See id. (describing the overlap between social and economic status). 
 208. See Marc Stuart Gerber, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and 
LearnFare: Wealth Classifications Revisited, 81 GEO. L.J., 2141, 2162 (1993) 
(characterizing wealth as quasi-immutable through statistics and describing the 
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state of being, or social status.”209 Money is the biggest determinate 
on societal hierarchy and status.210 It is also the biggest 
determinate of where an individual charged with a crime will 
spend their time before trial.211 
Like a disease,212 an individual’s economic status is a condition 
that is typically contracted involuntarily and is unlikely to 
change.213 “Children who are born into a low-class family have only 
a one percent chance of reaching the top five percent of the income 
distribution, while children of the rich have about a twenty-two 
percent chance.”214 This creates an unequal playing field and the 
issue of poverty is one that has persisted throughout American 
history.215  
In 2016, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that 43.1 million 
Americans live in poverty.216 In 2017, the estimated federal 
poverty level for a family of four was $24,600, and for a family of 
two was $16,240.217 This amount is barely enough to afford the 
                                                                                                     
rare conditions in which economic status may change). 
 209. Condition, MERRIAM Webster Online Dictionary (2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/condition (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 210. See DeAngelis, supra note 206 (describing the convergence between 
wealth and social status). 
 211. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 194 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
(describing the system of monetizing pretrial freedom) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 212. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (“[A] law which 
made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought 
to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 213. See Shayan H. Modarres, The Fourteenth Amendment Isn’t “Broke”: Why 
Wealth Should Be a Suspect Classification Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 171, 175 (2011) (arguing that wealth 
should be a suspect class because of the convergence with race and poverty). 
 214. Id. at 176. 
 215. See James E. Clyburn, Developing the Will and the Way to Address 
Persistent Poverty in America, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2014) (describing the 
issues surrounding poverty and the history of poverty in the United States). 
 216. What is the Current Poverty Rate in the United States?, CTR. FOR POVERTY 
RES., U. OF CA., DAVIS (last updated Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-current-poverty-rate-united-states (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 217. Federal Poverty Level, HEALTHCARE.GOV (2018), 
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basic necessities of life. For an indigent family of two, a $1,000 
bond is equivalent to one month’s pay and $5,000 bond amount 
would constitute approximately thirty-one percent of their yearly 
income. In these circumstances, a defendant likely would not have 
the financial means to afford even a small secured cash bond; thus, 
would remain in pre-trial custody, for days, weeks, or months,218 
because of their financial status.  
V. Applying Robinson 
Eighth Amendment challenges using Robinson have largely 
been an uphill battle; however, the Robinson decision is not a dead 
letter and its principles are not solely applicable to particular 
crimes.219 Under Robinson, an individual may not be punished 
based on their mere status, or an involuntary condition.220 The 
current use of secured cash bonds to detain poor individuals 
punishes the status of poverty, and thus runs afoul of the 
fundamental principle in Robinson.  
Although bond is imposed after an individual is charged with 
a crime, the effect of bond works in a way which is constitutionally 
synonymous to the issue in Robinson. While in Robinson the Court 
looked specifically at a statute which criminalized addiction,221 
bond operates in a way which criminalizes a status, like the 
California statute. Furthermore, although textually dissimilar to 
a vagrancy statute, the effects are synonymous. A homeless man 
                                                                                                     
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-FPL/ (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 218. See generally Jamie Fellner, et al., “Not in it for Justice,” HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-
pretrial-detention-and-bail-system-unfairly (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (analyzing 
statistics surrounding the cash bond system and the effects of cash bond on poor 
defendants) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 219. See Luna, supra note 24, at 50 (“[I]t’s promise would go unfulfilled, as 
the case was downscaled from a revolutionary spark to a modest principle.”). 
 220. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662–67 (1962) (“To be addicted 
to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition and not an act” and statute 
prohibiting such status violates the fourteenth amendment). 
 221. See id. at 662 (“[T]he statute made it a misdemeanor for a person either 
to use narcotics, or to be addicted to the use of narcotics.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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sleeping on the street who is charged under a vagrancy ordinance 
will spend time in jail merely because he is homeless.222 A poor 
individual who is unable to afford pre-trail release will spend time 
in jail, not because he is dangerous or a flight risk, but because he 
is poor. The majority in Robinson voiced this exact concern; and 
stated that even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual 
punishment if that punishment stemmed from the criminalization 
of a status or condition.223  
The Court in Powell distinguished a mere condition from an 
involuntary condition, and in doing so, held that Powell had not 
established that his condition as a chronic alcoholic left him unable 
to control his actions.224 The Court further distinguished Powell 
from Robinson by articulating the importance of mens rea, or “a 
guilty mind” for criminal liability.225 After Powell v. Texas, many 
believed the Court greatly narrowed the constitutional thrust of 
Robinson.226 Although in Powell the Court refused to extend 
Robinson to a chronic alcoholic charged with public intoxication,227 
this narrowing does not affect the decision’s applicability to status 
crimes and the criminal bond system. Even the narrowest 
interpretation of Robinson, prohibits a state from punishing a 
                                                                                                     
 222. See Smith, supra note 42, at 293 (“[H]omeless persons must commit a 
punishable crime in order to satisfy the undeniable need for sleep.”). 
 223. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel 
and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
 224. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 553 (1968) (“[N]othing in the record 
indicates that he could not have done his drinking in private or that he was so 
inebriated at the time that he had lost control of his movements and wandered 
into the public street.”). 
 225. See id. at 533 (“[H]is behavior lacked the critical element of mens rea. 
Whatever may be the merits of such a doctrine of criminal responsibility, it surely 
cannot be said to follow from Robinson.”). 
 226. See Luna, supra note 24, at 71 (describing how the court appeared to 
limit the Robinson decision in Powell). 
 227. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 535 (“We are unable to concluded . . . that chronic 
alcoholics . . . suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get 
drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their performance of either 
or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication.”). 
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mere status.228 That is, punishing an individual for who they are,229 
or in the context of secured cash bonds, punishing an individual for 
what they do not have. 
This Note does not argue that an individual who is poor and 
commits a criminal act cannot be punished under the law for that 
crime; rather, this Note purports that the use of a secured cash 
bond to detain poor individuals before a conviction for a crime is 
unconstitutional under Robinson and the Eighth Amendment.  
Criminal defendants and inmates have used Robinson in 
federal claims in an attempt to invalidate anti-recidivism statutes, 
long prison terms, parole procedures, and prison discipline 
procedures.230 The difference between criminal bond and 
challenges to prison terms and procedure, is that bond is pre-trial 
and the presumption of innocence is still intact. Further, the 
determinate factor for pre-trial release is based upon a status.231  
For many crimes, a secured cash bond punishes a poor 
defendant, merely because of his economic status.232 In countless 
instances, high bond amounts are placed on defendants charged 
with non-violent misdemeanors.233 The largest determining factor 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the 
Substantive Criminal Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 635, 650 (1966) (“A reading of 
Robinson based on the pure status theory sharply limits the decision’s 
significance; yet this is the interpretation of the case that most courts have 
apparently adopted.”). 
 229. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (“We hold that a state 
law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has 
never . .  . been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Smith, supra 
note 42, at 293 (stating that statutes which punish homelessness are 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).  
 230. See Luna, supra note 24, at 67 (describing the importance of the 
Robinson interpretation for constitutional challenges to various statutes). 
 231. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 194 (Dec. 2010) 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
(describing the system of monetizing pretrial freedom and the laws that lead to 
incarceration of poor individuals but not wealthy individuals) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 232. See id. (same). 
 233. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Defendants Can’t Be Jailed Solely Because of 
Inability to Post Bail, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/chicago-bail-reform.html (“Not only does 
this cost society more in the long run, but it also means that taxpayers foot the 
bill for nonviolent defendants . . . even though they pose little threat.”) (on file 
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of whether a defendant will be released before trial is not based on 
what crime he is accused of, the defendant’s dangerousness, or risk 
of flight, it is based on money.234  
Anthony Cooper, a fifty-six-year-old on social security, was 
charged with public intoxication, after being picked up at a bus 
station.235 Cooper’s bond was set at $300 through a fixed bond 
schedule.236 Because Mr. Cooper could not afford the $300, he 
remained in jail for six days.237 Ms. O’Donnell, a single mother in 
Texas was arrested for driving without a valid driver’s license.238 
Her bail was set at $2,500.239 Because Ms. O’Donnell was poor and 
unable to pay her bond amount, she spent three days in jail.240  
 In 2007, OJ Simpson was charged with twelve criminal counts 
including robbery, kidnapping, burglary, and assault with a deadly 
weapon.241 Two days after Simpson’s bond hearing, he was 
released on a $125,000 bond.242 After Simpson’s release on pre-trial 
bond, Simpson was rearrested for violating a no-contact condition 
of his bond. Simpson’s bond was reset at $250,000.243 Because of 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 234. See Lisa Foster, Remarks at ABA's 11th Annual Summit on Public 
Defense (Feb. 6, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
director-lisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-annual-
summit) (“Bail exacerbates and perpetuates poverty because of course only people 
who cannot afford the bail assessed or to post a bond—people who are already 
poor—are held in custody pretrial.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 235. Leon Neyfakh, Is Bail Unconstitutional? SLATE.COM (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/06/is_bail_unconstit
utional_our_broken_system_keeps_the_poor_in_jail_and_lets.html (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. The Editorial Board, Locked Up for Being Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/opinion/locked-up-for-being-
poor.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. O.J. Simpson Released After Judge Scolds Him, Doubles Bail, CNN (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2008, 3:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/ 
01/16/simpson.bail/index.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  
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Simpson’s economic status, he was able to post the second bond 
and was once again released from custody.244 Mr. Cooper and Ms. 
O’Donnell spent more days in pre-trial custody for non-violent 
misdemeanors than OJ Simpson, who was charged and 
subsequently convicted of twelve violent felonies.245  
Mr. Cooper and Ms. O’Donnell’s stories happen daily and 
demonstrate the use of secured cash bonds to punish the status of 
poverty.246 Mr. Cooper and Ms. O’Donnell did not pose a safety risk 
to the public, nor did they pose a risk of flight.247 Further, both 
individuals maintained a presumption of innocence. The 
requirement that Mr. Cooper and Ms. O’Donnell, and defendants 
like them, pay a secured cash bond in order to afford pre-trail 
release, is unconstitutional under Robinson.248 A secured cash 
bond punished Mr. Cooper and Ms. O’Donnell for who they are, not 
for what they did. Mr. Cooper and Ms. O’Donnell spent days in jail 
simply because they were poor.249  
                                                                                                     
 244. See id. (“Former football star, O.J. Simpson walked out of jail late 
Wednesday after posting a $250,000 bail.”). 
 245. See id. (listing the crimes O.J. Simpson was charged with and how long 
he spent in pre-trial custody).  
 246. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
Nonfelony Defendants in New York City, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 47 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf 
(analyzing the statistics surrounding the cash bail system) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also id. 
(describing the laws that lead to incarceration of poor individuals but not wealthy 
individuals). 
 247. See Editorial Board, Locked Up for Being Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/opinion/locked-up-for-being-
poor.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 




the stories of criminal defendants who remained in pre-trial custody because they 
were unable to pay small monetary bonds for petit offenses) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 248. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (“But, in the light of 
contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a 
disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 249. See Leon Neyfakh, Is Bail Unconstitutional?, SLATE.COM (Jun. 30, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/06/is_bail_unconstit
utional_our_broken_system_keeps_the_poor_in_jail_and_lets.html (“Our broken 
system keeps the poor in jail and lets the rich walk free.”) (on file with the 
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Bail is intended to “afford [the] release of a defendant while 
reasonably assuring court appearance and public safety.”250 The 
criminal bond system is not supposed to be punitive; however, if a 
defendant cannot pay, they are sentenced to jail.251 This jail 
sentence is based on poverty.252 Every year, over half a million 
individuals remain in pre-trial custody because they have 
insufficient financial means.253 Depending on the jurisdiction, trial 
calendars can be so clogged that a defendant is forced to wait 
months, or even years, for their day in court.254 “[T]o punish the 
unfortunate for [their] circumstances debases society,”255 and the 
evolving standards of decency which underpin the Eighth 
Amendment and Robinson, reject this practice. 
VI. Policy Concerns & Reform Efforts 
In addition to the constitutional concerns under Robinson and 
the Eighth Amendment, the current criminal cash bond system 
creates several due process issues and policy concerns.256 Among 
                                                                                                     
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 250. See BAIL BOND, U. OF PRETRIAL, https://university.pretrial.org/glossary/ 
bailbond (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (providing a comprehensive definition for the 
term “bail bond”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 251. See Maya Dukmasova, Cook County’s Tradition of Using Bail as 
Punishment May Be Hard to Change, CHICAGO READER (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2017/09/19/cook-countys-
tradition-of-using-bail-as-punishment-may-be-hard-to-change (describing cash 
bond as punishment) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 252. See id. (same). 
 253. Dobbie et al., supra note 71, at 9. 
 254. See Jamie Fellner, et al., “Not in it for Justice”, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-
pretrial-detention-and-bail-system-unfairly (examining trial calendars in 
multiple counties to show how long defendants often wait for their day in court) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 255. See Parker v. Mun. Judge, 83 Nev. 214, 216 (1967) (emphasizing how 
crime and the need for welfare or employment must not be confused). 
 256. See The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income 
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these are the effects of bond on the presumption of innocence, 
undue pressures on defendants to plea, the increased likelihood of 
wrongful convictions, and racial discrimination due to economic 
disparities. Further, the effect of secured cash bonds on indigent 
defendants extends beyond the courtroom.257  
Secured cash bonds hold poor defendants in custody and 
causes them to lose things on the outside, making recidivism more 
likely.258 These individuals can lose employment, housing, custody 
of children, education opportunities, and support systems.259 In a 
New York University Law Review Article, Arthur Goldberg, a 
former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, outlined many of 
these concerns.260 
After arrest, the accused who is poor must often await the 
disposition of his case in jail because of his inability to raise bail, 
while the accused who can afford bail is free to return to his 
family and job . . . . This is an example of justice denied, of a 
man imprisoned for no reason other than his poverty. Think of 
the needless waste . . . every time a responsible person 
presumed by a law to be innocent is kept in jail awaiting trial 
solely because he is unable to raise money bail.261 
Additionally, many reformers, civil rights organizations, and 
legislative bodies have recognized these issues and are working 
toward “chipping away at money bail, arguing it discriminates 
against the poor, ruins innocent people’s lives, fuels mass 
incarceration and contributes to wrongful convictions.”262  
The push towards the elimination of the cash bail system and 
bail reform in the United States is increasingly growing. 
“California reforms its bail system so that rich and poor alike are 
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treated fairly;”263 this statement was made as California became 
the first state to eliminate the criminal cash bond system through 
the California Money Bail Reform Act.264 The bill passed August 
2018, by a vote of 41–27.265 Although the fight against money bail 
has taken place for years, the California Court of Appeal’s decision, 
In re Humphrey,266 appears to have been a large force behind the 
new legislation.267 In January 2018, the California Court of Appeal 
held that because the trial court set Kenneth Humphrey’s bond 
amount at $350,000 without looking into Humphrey’s ability to 
pay or considering non-financial conditions of bail, Humphrey was 
entitled to a new bail hearing.268 The California Court of Appeal 
further instructed that “[i]f the [trial] court determines that 
[Humphreys] cannot afford the amount of money bail it finds 
necessary to ensure [his] future court appearances, it may set bail 
at that amount only upon a determination by clear and convincing 
evidence that no less restrictive alternative will satisfy that 
purpose.”269 The court also stated that “legislation is desperately 
needed” and that both the judiciary and legislature need to “change 
the way [they] think about bail.”270 
Following In re Humphreys, the California Legislature 
re-evaluated the California bail system. The California Money Bail 
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Reform Act will be placed into effect October 1, 2019.271 Under the 
Act, individuals who are arrested and detained will be subjected to 
a pre-trial risk assessment.272 The assessment will not be required 
for individuals charged with misdemeanors, and these individuals 
should be detained and then released except in special 
circumstances.273 Individuals subjected to the pre-trial risk 
assessment will be given an assessment of low risk, medium risk, 
or high risk.274 Under the Act, individuals who are assessed as low 
or medium risk should be released on his or her own recognizance 
or released with the least restrictive non-financial conditions to 
ensure public safety or the defendant’s appearance in court.275  
Although the California Money Bail Reform Act will likely 
solve several issues in the cash bond system, many advocates of 
bail reform are concerned that the Act may lead to increased 
incarceration and preventative detention.276 For individuals who 
are classified as high-risk or meet “specific conditions,” it is within 
the court’s discretion to detain the individuals, if after an 
arraignment, the court finds that there are no pre-trial conditions 
of supervision that would reasonably ensure public safety or the 
appearance of the individual in court.277 Additionally, the Act 
creates a presumption that no condition of release would 
reasonably ensure public safety for individuals charged with a 
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violent felony, or individuals convicted of a violent felony in the 
last five years.278 This presumption is rebuttable.279 The Act also 
gives the prosecution power, “under specified circumstances,” to 
file motions to seek the detention of individuals, who otherwise 
would be released, through a preventative detention hearing.280  
Although California is currently the only state to eliminate the 
cash bond system, several other states and courts have 
implemented bond reform and new tools to determine bail. Several 
courts have implemented a 
Federal Risk Assessment Tool [that] relies on nine key factors 
to predict pretrial risk, including (1) “charges pending against 
the defendant at the time of arrest,” (2) “number of prior 
misdemeanor arrests,” (3) “number of prior felony arrests,” 
(4) “number of prior failures to appear,” (5) employment status 
of defendant at the time of arrest, (6) defendant's residency 
status, (7) defendant's substance abuse problems, (8) “nature of 
the primary charge,” and (9) if the primary charge is a 
misdemeanor or a felony.281  
Point values are given for each of the risk factors and added to 
create a comprehensive risk score in order to determine sufficient 
bond conditions.282  
The Federal Risk Assessment Tool is just a glance into the 
national trend moving away from the current cash-driven bail 
systems. New Jersey, Arizona, Kentucky, and several counties in 
other states have adopted the Arnold Public Safety Assessment in 
their courtrooms.283 The Arnold Public Safety Assessment is a 
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[P]retrial risk assessment tool [that] uses evidence based, 
neutral information to predict the likelihood that an 
individual will commit a new crime if released before 
trial, and to predict the likelihood that he will fail to 
return for a future court hearing. In addition, it flags 
those defendants who present an elevated risk of 
committing a violent crime.284 
The Arnold Safety Assessment uses nine risk factors and 
analyzes them based on three categories: Failure to Appear, New 
Criminal Activity, and New Violent Criminal Activity.285 The nine 
risk factors are age at arrest, current violent offense, pending 
charge at the time of the offense, prior misdemeanor and felony 
convictions, prior violent conviction, prior failure to appear in the 
past two years, prior failure to appear older than two years, and 
prior sentence to incarceration.286 Each factor is assigned points 
“according to the strength of the relationship between the factor 
and the specific pretrial outcome.”287 The Assessment does not 
replace judicial discretion, but aids judges in determining risk and 
sufficient conditions of bond.288  
In New Jersey, the legislature implemented the New Jersey 
Criminal Justice Reform Act in 2017.289 The Act established the 
use of the Arnold Public Safety Assessment for determining the 
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pre-trial release of a defendant.290 Although still at the early stages 
of implementation, in the last year, this algorithm for release 
conditions has cut down approximately one third of defendants 
who are detained pre-trial in New Jersey.291 “Court officials say the 
early numbers show the new procedure is already working: 
[P]eople who aren’t dangerous are not being jailed solely because 
they can’t afford bail, and dangerous people aren’t being released 
even though they can afford to pay.”292 The New Jersey Criminal 
Justice Reform Act was recently upheld by the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals293 and has been seen by many as a step toward the 
complete elimination of cash bond in the state.294 
In July 2017, U.S. Senators Kamala D. Harris and Rand Paul 
introduced the Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017.295 In an 
effort to replace the state practice of money bail, this bipartisan 
bail reform bill aims to monetarily incentivize states to replace 
money bail systems with “individualized, pretrial assessments 
with risk-based decision making.”296 The bill also aims to 
encourage the presumption of release pre-trial and the 
implementation of non-financial conditions before imposing 
financial conditions.297  
The new bail assessment tools and bipartisan bill are positive 
changes that begin to address the concerns of Robinson as applied 
to bail. In order for the bail system to be constitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment and Robinson, secured cash bonds cannot be 
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used to criminalize the status of poverty. The use of a secured cash 
bond, when non-financial bond conditions would be effective, 
punishes the poor for simply being poor. 
V. Conclusion 
For the poor, cash bail means jail.298 In 1962, the Supreme 
Court held that criminalizing a status, is unconstitutional under 
the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment.299 
Applying Robinson, the use of a secured cash bond to hold poor 
defendants in custody, is unconstitutional. Individuals are 
spending days, weeks, or months in jail because of who they are, 
and the Court in Robinson explicitly rejected this practice.300  
Although Powell narrowed the scope of Robinson, the core 
principle remained untouched: A state cannot punish an individual 
merely for that individual’s status.301 The applicability of this 
principle is best seen through subsequent cases that successfully 
used Robinson to invalidate vagrancy ordinances. Many courts 
struck down vagrancy ordinances and statutes because they 
punish a mere status, the status of homelessness. Under these 
laws, a homeless individual spends time in jail simply because he 
is homeless. This violates the Eight Amendment. 
The thrust of Robinson extends to criminal bond statutes as 
well. A poor defendant charged with a crime, who does not pose a 
risk of flight or threat to public safety, will spend time in jail before 
trial, simply because he is poor.302 The statistics that support this 
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assertion are alarming.303 Every day, poor individuals spend time 
in jail because they cannot pay a secured cash bond as low as 
$100.304 To these individuals, that $100 serves as a complete 
barrier to freedom, for no other reason than the defendant’s 
financial status.305 This $100 is not a punishment for what this 
defendant did, which at this stage has yet to be proven, but rather, 
for who they are.  
The arguments for the elimination of the cash bond system 
have almost completely centered around the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, if the Eighth Amendment and Robinson 
are applied, the current cash bond system is unconstitutional.306 
The use of a secured cash bond as a means to punish the poor, like 
punishing an individual for the disease of leprosy, is “barbarous”307 
in light of the standards of decency which drive the Eighth 
Amendment. Punishing poverty through the use of secured cash 
bonds, for non-violent misdemeanors or where non-financial 
conditions of release are sufficient, violates Robinson and the 
Eighth Amendment.308  
Recently, there has been a strong push toward the elimination 
of the criminal cash bond system and reform efforts. Many 
legislatures have implemented assessment tools in order to make 
sure bond is not imposed arbitrarily. In order to comport with 
Robinson and the Eighth Amendment, secured cash bonds cannot 
be used to hold individuals in jail merely because they are poor. 
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Secured cash bonds should not be imposed arbitrarily or through a 
fixed bail schedule. Because fixed bail schedules do not take into 
account a defendant’s ability to pay, they should be completely 
eliminated. For jurisdictions that give judges discretion in setting 
bond, better tools must be in place to assess a defendant’s ability 
to pay and the effectiveness of non-financial conditions in lieu of 
financial conditions. Facially, the California Money Bail Reform 
Act appears to address these issues.  
The use of a secured cash bond should not be standard 
practice, but instead a carefully limited exception. Financial 
conditions for release should only be considered where non-
financial conditions are insufficient to mitigate risks of flight or 
safety. There are many options for non-financial conditions of 
release, such as reporting requirements, house arrest, no contact 
orders, substance abuse programs, drug testing, court date 
reminders, or travel restrictions.309 When financial conditions of 
release are found to be necessary, the court should consider a 
defendant’s ability to pay. When examining a defendant’s ability 
to pay, the court should assess several factors. These factors could 
include information such as employment, household income, 
number of children, public assistance or government benefits, 
monthly expenses, and liquid assets. Whether a defendant has a 
public defender or court appointed attorney should also be a factor 
considered by the court.  
Bail should never be imposed for the purpose of ensuring a 
defendant remains in jail until trial.310 The criminal bond system 
is intended to “afford [the] release of a defendant while reasonably 
assuring court appearance and public safety.”311 In many 
situations, these three goals can be met without the use of a 
secured cash bond. Bond practices that hold individuals in custody 
because they are unable to pay amounts such as $100 or $500, 
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undoubtedly punish the poor. The use of secured cash bonds solely 
to hold individuals in custody for non-violent misdemeanors or 
where non-financial conditions are sufficient, should be rejected. 
The current criminal cash bond system punishes poor defendants 
for who they are, not for what they have done. Robinson and the 
Eighth Amendment explicitly reject this practice.312 
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